Tu Quoque? Too Cute.

Unable to defend the Despicable Cretin's pardon of His Grey Eminence's henchman, the Sliver -- repugs still supporting the crime family in the White House -- opt instead for (here's a surprise) misdirection. Within hours of the act, the repugs had crafted their non-response to the expected outrage -- Bill Clinton.

O. Them repugs is a clever gang. But maybe a mite too clever -- they want to force the Dems to defend the Clinton pardons as a quid pro quo for looking into the Libby pardon.

But there are serious problems with the Sliver's Defend-by-Deflection strategy: 1. In 2001, many Dems (like Henry Waxman, Chuck Schumer, and Barney Frank) were vocal in their disapproval of Clinton's last-minute pardon spree (and Democrats defending the former President were difficult to locate); 2. The repug strategy reminds us that, unlike the Despicable Cretin, Clinton waived executive privilege and encouraged his advisers to testify candidly; and 3. Whether Bush acted properly is unaffected by whether Clinton did.

The pardon power is Constitutional and Congress has no role in the process (a matter specifically debated in 1787). But, it is entirely appropriate that Congress look at whether there was improper motivation at work in the pardon issuance. Did, as it appears to many, the Despicable Cretin save Scooter from parking his ass in jail for a single day in order to prevent Libby from offering the Prosecution a last-minute recollection as a bargaining chip? Today, Adam Liptak, lawyer cum reporter for the New York Times, offers a front-page examination of the Bush pardon history which provides some objective indication of the answer which seems mighty obvious from this corner.

Divining motive is not something done by looking into the eyes to read a soul -- as our Despicable Cretin should have learned by now. Absent a confession, it needs to be inferred from the circumstances. Beyond those most obvious here -- that our D.C. ignored existing policy and procedure in making the decision to protect Libby, that Libby didn't qualify for the save, that Libby was literally on the eve of moving into a new home, that the pardon was granted without the usual consultation with the Department of Justice, that a Libby change of heart, or improved memory, would have been embarrassing, at least, or dangerous, at more, for the Grey Eminence -- the relevant evidence would be a review of how the D.C.'s actions might have departed from the D.C.'s prior conduct and statements on the issue -- when he wasn't involved in what some see as an attempt to obstruct justice by protecting an underling potentially capable of implicating the D.C. himself.

And that's just what Liptak undertook. His report offers a careful review of Bush's pardon (and, okay, commutation) record from his years as Governor of Texas, as well as Bush's own writings and statements on the subject. As President, we learn that Bush has granted only 1 out of every 1,000 commutation requests made through the Office of the Pardon Attorney.

We learn that, until the Scooter problem, the D.C. refused to consider such applications absent affirmative answers to two questions: 1. Is there considerable doubt about the guilt of the applicant? and 2. Has the applicant exhausted all legal appeals? We know this because the D.C. hisself wrote in his 1999 memoir, "A Charge to Keep":

“In every case . . . . I would ask: Is there any doubt about this individual’s guilt or innocence? And, have the courts had ample opportunity to review all the legal issues in this case?”

The 2008 edition will no doubt have an asterisk. Bush, and just about everyone else, harbor's no delusion about Libby's guilt and the D.C. hisself pretermitted the first appeal on the commuted sentence. Liptak spoke with a Texas lawyer and professor familiar with Bush's gubernatorial record on such things. The prevailing view, we learn, is that the Libby decision represented not only a change, but a radical departure in Bush's documented, long-standing approach to the clemency power:

"As governor, Bush essentially viewed the clemency power as limited to cases of demonstrable actual innocence," said Jordan M. Steiker, a law professor at the University of Texas . . . ., "The exercise of the commutation power in Libby . . . represents a dramatic shift from his attitude toward clemency in Texas, and it is entirely inconsistent with his longstanding, very limited approach."

Congress has justifiably asked the D.C. to explain this "dramatic shift" and decisions which is "entirely inconsistent with his longstanding, very limited approach." Those factors examined by the Liptak report, together with the departure from precedent, combined with the D.C.'s failure to follow Bill Clinton's example and to, instead, take the Presidential equivalent of the fifth (as he most certainly will do), should tell us all we need to know about whether the motive was legitimate or dishonorable.

Update: John Conyers later this am, from The Hill-- "House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers (D-Mich.) urged President Bush Sunday to waive executive privilege and let his lawyers testify in Congress on the commutation of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s prison sentence.

“We’re asking him to waive executive privilege and allow his pardon lawyers or other experts, whom it appears he did not consult, explain this in a little more detail,” Conyers said. The lawmaker has scheduled a committee hearing for Wednesday to look into presidential powers with regard to pardons and commuting sentences.

With regard to Libby, Conyers said on “This Week with George Stephanopoulos” that “the suspicion was that if Mr. Libby went to prison, he might further implicate other people in the White House.

“This is why we’ve written the president, inviting him to do what President Clinton did, and namely to bring forward any of his pardon lawyers or anyone that can put a clear light on this and put this kind of feeling, that is fairly general, to rest,” he added."